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CORPORATE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT: THE ECONOMIC
AND TAX ASPECTS OF QUALIFIED PENSION,
PROFIT-SHARING, AND STOCK BONUS PLANS
I. I=ODUCTION
The industrial growth being realized by South Carolina is
fast bringing many economic changes to our state. The enact-
ment of the new South Carolina Business Corporation Act' and
the efforts of both state and local Industrial Development Boards
have combined to lure foreign capital and talent into the Pal-
metto State. In addition to this influx of business, South Caro-
lina talent and capital will increasingly be retained by the
attractive business features offered to all business residents.
As a result of this healthy growth of business within South
Carolina, the practicing lawyer will increasingly find himself
confronted with business legal problems and estate legal prob-
lems which not so long ago were left to the so-called specialists
in these fields.
Competition in the business world for qualified personnel and
the retention of these people once acquired have given rise to
a rapid growth and expansion of employee benefit programs.
Such'programs also lend themselves quite well to deferring fed-
eral and state income taxes for all participating employees.
This article will be devoted primarily to qualified pension,
profit-sharing, and stock bonus plans as they affect the cor-
porate entity and the individuals concerned.
More often than not, the lawyer comes into the picture after
a bank trust department, an insurance agent, or the employees,
through collective bargaining, have sold the employer on the
establishment of a retirement plan. It is incumbent upon the
lawyer at this point to thoroughly investigate the type of busi-
ness which is being conducted, whether the corporation is solely
owned or closely held, the benefit desires of the employer, the
financial position of the business, the history of corporate profits
in conjunction with the prospects for future profits, and last
but not least, the real reason for the decision to establish such
a plan.
This last point is most important to the lawyer if he is to
gain maximum tax advantages for the business and covered
employees. If the employer has an honest desire to establish
1. 12 S.C. CODE (1962) (Supp. 1963).
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a retirement program for all of his employees, the lawyer's
task is greatly simplified. However, if the employer is seeking to
cover only certain personnel and exclude others, the lawyer's
work is cut out for him.
As a starting point it must be kept in mind that no retirement
plan can be qualified under the Internal Revenue Code if it
discriminates in favor of directors, officers, or highly salaried
employees. 2 Once it is established that no discrimination is in-
volved in the desires of the employer, the lawyer then can




Naturally, there are advantages and disadvantages in each of
the various types of retirement programs.
First of all the plan must be non-discriminatory, 3 permanent
in nature,4 and in writing.5
A pension plan is especially attractive to older employees be-
cause it takes into account, as a general rule, their past service
to the business. Because they have fewer years of future ser-
vice, these people naturally desire the security of fixed retire-
ment benefits.
For this reason the corporation must decide just how secure
the retirement benefits will be. Under a pension plan with a
fixed formula for retirement, the employee will know exactly
what he is guaranteed as retirement income and can plan his
future accordingly. This security of retirement is a most im-
portant factor to be considered.
However, in order for the employer to be able to guarantee
these fixed benefits, a fixed expenditure is incurred under this
type of plan, and it must be met each year whether a profit
is realized or not. Such a burden on a new corporation may well
be ill-advised because of the morale affect on employees if a plan
has to be discontinued for business necessity.
2. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 401 (a) (3), (4), (5), and (6); See also Rev.
Rul. 57-163, part 5, 1957-1 Cum. BULL. 68-107; 1961-2 Cum. BULL. 123-132.
These two Cum. Bull. are a must for initiating plan drafts.
3. Ibid.
4. 26 C.F.R. § 1.401-1 (b) (2) (1954), as amended by T.D. 6675 (1963),
1963-2 CuM. BULL. 151.
5. 26 C.F.R. § 1.401-1 (a) (2) (1954).
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2
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol16/iss4/3
SURVEY OF SOUTH CAROLINA LAW
There are five basic questions to be answered in the estab-
lishment of a pension:
1. WHO? This is in reference to who will be included in the
plan or who the employer desires to be eligible for participa-
tion.
Since a pension plan is designed to systematically pay de-
finite and determinable benefits to employees at retirement,6
an employer should protect himself from covering those em-
ployees who are seasonal, casual, or part-time.7
There are several ways that this may be accomplished, the
best of which seems to be a minimum age for coverage,
coupled with a waiting period after becoming employed be-
fore the new employee may come into the plan. An example
of this method would be to require an employee to be with
the corporation full-time for a period of at least three years
and have attained the age of twenty-one before becoming
eligible for participation in the plan. In no case, however,
can the waiting period exceed five years." This device elimi-
nates the short-term employees.
Requiring each employee to work a minimum number of
hours each week or a minimum number of months each year
before becoming eligible for participation will eliminate cov-
erage of part-time employees.0
There are also methods that may be used to exclude certain
other employees without having the plan labeled discrimina-
tory. An employer may, for example, include salaried em-
ployees and exclude wage-earners, cover only the sales force,
a certain factory, the office personnel, and may in addition,
thereto, exclude all employees who earn below a certain an-
nual income, provided a large percentage of the lowest paid
employees are still eligible for inclusion. 10
Once the short-term, part-time, and undesired classifications
of employees have been eliminated, at least 70% of the re-
maining employees must be eligible in order for the plan to
qualify."
6. 26 C.F.R. § 1.401-1 (b) (1) (i) (1954), as amended by T.D. 6675 (1963),
1963-2 Cum. BULL. 151.
7. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 401 (a) (3) (A).
8. Ibid.
9. Note 7, supra.
10. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 401 (a) (5); 26 C.F.R. § 1.401-3 (1954).
11. Note 7, supra.
1964]
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Furthermore, if the plan is contributory on the part of the
employees, at least 80% of those eligible must participate in
order for the plan to qualify.
12
There is no specific number of persons necessary to qualify
a pension plan. If a corporation has only one employee eli-
gible, and the plan is non-discriminatory, it will qualify.18
The corporation may have its plan fail to qualify if there
is any discrimination against "collective-bargaining" groups.
It would seem that such would be allowed provided the pur-
pose was to equalize the benefits between union and non-
union employees, and between those members of a union cover-
ed under a union plan with those members of the union not
covered under the union plan. Discrimination against any
"collective bargaining" group may involve questions of labor
law as well as tax law.
When attempting to determine whether or not the corpor-
ation's desire is bona fide in setting up a pension or profit
sharing plan, a close look should be made to see if there will
be covered only family members, outside attorneys, outside
accountants, or other persons employed by, but not directly
assiciated with the firm.14
2. WHAT? Once the plan is determined to be non-discrimina-
tory, counsel must then look to the amount of compensation
to be awarded and the formula to be used in reaching this
award.
When past service is being given consideration in the for-
mula to be used, it becomes necessary to know the history of the
corporation's existence. All employees may be given due credit
for their service to the business from the first day of employ-
ment. This is not true, however, of sole proprietors, or part-
ners of a partnership prior to the date of incorporation.
Partners and sole proprietors prior to incorporation are not
considered employees, and their past service for qualified
plans may be counted only from the date of incorporation. 15
The amount of compensation presently being received must
also be reasonable or the corporation may not be allowed a
deduction for the full amount of compensation paid to an
12. Ibid. See also Rev. Rul. 61-157, part 4 (m), 1961-2 Cum. BULL. 85-86.
13. Rev. Rul. 55-81, 1961-2 Cum. BULL. 392.
14. Rev. Rul. 61-157, part 2 (e) (4), 1961-2 Cum. BULL. 72.
15. Rev. Ru. 61-157, part 2 (e) (1), 1961-2 Cum. BuLL. 71.
[Vol. 16
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employee. If an employee's salary has been challenged by the
Internal Revenue Service as being unreasonable, that portion
which has been disallowed should not be used as part of the
"compensation formula." An employee's compensation seems
to be the most used method of arriving at a reasonable re-
tirement income, and where the corporation is losing a partial
deduction for present over-compensation, likewise will it
lose a partial deduction for contributions to the retirement
plan based on the excess compensation. 6
The "compensation formula" has many advantages to both
the corporation and employees. First of all, it allows the
highest paid employees, usually management and sales per-
sonnel, to receive the majority of benefits from such a plan.
Secondly, it encourages the lower paid employees to compete
for better corporate positions because with each promotion,
the employee's retirement income is increased.17 Thirdly, and
most importantly, it allows the employee to retire on an in-
come based on the standard of living to which he had become
accustomed.
This is not to say that the corporation should attempt to
fund an employee's retirement at 100% of his highest salary
or last year's income prior to retirement. The purpose of such
a plan is to ease a great sociological and economic problem
for both the employer and employee, while at the same time
tying the employee closer to the corporation and fulfilling
a moral obligation to him. For these reasons, a percentage of
income based on the average earnings from his five highest
salaried years of service to the corporation seems quite plaus-
ible.
In reaching the desired percentage of income to be paid at
retirement, it further becomes necessary to include Social
Security benefits at this planning stage. Basically, the cor-
poration is already funding a portion of the employee's retire-
ment each time it pays Social Security Taxes. Integration
of these retirement benefits into the proposed plan will give
the employee a more realistic retirement income while lessen-
ing the burden on the corporation. An integrated plan which
combines Social Security and Pension benefits to retire an
employee with 40%, 50%, or 60% of his average earnings over
16. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.404 (a)-(3) (b) (1954).
17. See Rev. Rul. 61-157, part 5 (m), 1961-2 Cum. BuLT. 93.
1964]
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the five highest salaried years of his employment should well
satisfy the purposes of such a plan.'
8
The "past service" feature of a plan at its inception is a
great offset for the older employees of the corporation. The
younger employees will naturally be taken care of through
future service, but recognition of past services in the formula
will increase the pension of those nearing retirement and will
better employee-employer relations.19
At this point it is well to point out that a pure pension
plan is designed only to fund an employee's retirement-
nothing more, nothing less. If he quits or dies prior to retire-
ment, no benefits are paid. When he dies after retirement, the
pension ceases. In a pure pension plan it is quite simple to
determine the funds needed, based on mortality tables and
compound interest, to accomplish this corporate desire.
However, there are many other benefits that may be in-
cluded in a pension plan which make it more attractive and
plausible. Such benefits are called supplemental benefits and
will naturally increase the cost of the plan. It is necessary that
these benefits be non-discriminatory the same as the basic
plan in order for the corporation to receive favorable tax
treatment thereon. Supplemental benefits must be incidental
to the main purpose of the plan20 and these include:
(a) Disability Payments-As a general rule only large cor-
porate pension plans include disability benefits due to the
cost factor. Smaller corporations may well do better to carry
separate commercial Accident and Sickness type policies for
salary continuation on certain classifications of employees.
Such policies carried on certain personnel as a classification
will separately qualify for favorable tax treatment,2 1 while
at the same time ease the corporate obligation to these people
during the period of disability. This type of person naturally
is costly to replace, and during a period of disability the
corporation normally would continue his income out of future
profits while awaiting his return to work. On the other hand,
18. See Rev. Rul. 61-157, part 4 (j) (1) and (2), 1961-2 Cum. BULL. 83-84.
These two sections lay out the integration rules and benefits derived therefrom.
19. See Rev. Rul. 61-157, part 5 (r), 1961-2 CuM. BULL. 94. When there is
a minimum age and service requirement, a plan which credits past service of
original participants but does not so credit past service for those entering later,
may be discriminatory.
20. See Rev. Rul. 61-157, part 2 (i), 1961-2 Cum. BULL. 73.
21. Such a plan would probably not qualify under § 401, but should qualify
as a business expense under § 162 of the Code.
[Vol. 16
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the laboring class would be easier to replace and the cost of
including all these people under a disability benefit of the
pension plan of a small business may not be feasible.
The larger corporations may well be able to afford such a
benefit and, if so, it would be to the benefit of the corpor-
ation and employees to include it.
An employee is allowed to receive up to $100.00 per week
income-tax-free under a qualified disability plan when paid
for reasons of disability.22 However, it may be wise to forego
disability payments to any employee with less than a certain
number of years employment or under a certain age. An
example of such an eligibility requirement would be that
only those employees who have attained 50 years of age or
have been employed for at least 15 years will qualify for
disability benefits. This requirement will reduce the cost
while providing for those employees to whom the corporation
would most likely feel obligated and who would be in need of
such a benefit.
Disability payments should furthermore cover the neces-
sities of the employee during a period of disability. Extreme
caution should be exercised in the selection of a disability
benefit formula so as not to encourage an employee to "ride
sick-call", so-to-speak, and not desire to return to work. Quite
naturally, if an employee has no real "financial" motivation
for returning to work, his "mental" recuperating process may
be greatly hindered.
Coupled with a carefully selected benefit formula should
be a direct monitor of the employee's physical condition dur-
ing his period of disability. If the plan is non-insured, com-
pany physicians or company appointed physicians should
periodically examine the employee to insure his return to
work at the earliest possible date. If the plan is insured, the
employee will be required to meet the disability tests as de-
signed by the insurance company, and this relieves the corpor-
ation of a great burden as to deciding whether or not the
employee is truly disabled. Since the insurance company
has assumed the burden and risk involved, the corporation
should not intervene unless it is obvious that the insurer is
taking advantage of the employee.
22. 26 C.F.R. § 1.105-4 (d) (1) (1954) ; See also INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 105 (d) and § 106. See also Rev. Rul. 62-152, 1961-2 CuM. BULL. 126,
expressing various limitations on disability benefits in an integrated plan.
1964]
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(b) Vesting-A vesting schedule in a corporate pension
plan may well be described as a pension prior to retirement,
but it also serves many other valuable purposes.
23
First of all, it has already been pointed out that a cor-
poration should not even attempt to include short-term em-
ployees. However, once an employee is eligible for coverage
under a pension plan, the corporation may well find itself
subject to a civil action and in trouble with the Internal
Revenue Service for terminating employment or pension pay-
ments without cause in order to deny an employee his retire-
ment benefits.
24
On the other hand, there are many instances when it be-
comes necessary to discharge employees, the reasons for which
are quite sound. Even then, it seems quite appropriate to
provide severance pay unless the cause of termination has been
completely on the part of the employee. When severance is
due to a change in business conditions and severance pay is
deemed abvisable, it naturally must come out of current
expenditures and income. However, a vesting schedule within
a corporate pension plan may well serve this purpose.
Like any other supplemental benefit, vesting schedules vary
widely. It would appear, however, that the most workable
plan for the corporation would be one which entices the em-
ployee to remain. For example, a schedule which allows 25%
vesting after 5 years of service, 50% after 10 years of service,
757 after 15 years of service, and 100% after 20 years of
service would tend to keep the employee striving to complete
short periods of service and not to concentrate just on his
"old age."
Many differences of opinion also arise during the course
of employment which may breed thoughts of quitting on the
part of the employee. A vesting schedule could prove very
valuable in such a case. For example, if such an event oc-
curred after 9 years and 3 months of employment, the em-
ployee would hardly walk out at that point and deprive him-
self of this extra money when all he has to do is remain for
nine more months and capture a sizeable sum. More often
than not, after nine months he has forgotten his grievance
and is back in the "fold." This is known as buying "time"
for management.
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Although the pension plan must be primarily designed for
retirement only, periodic vesting of interests in the employee
in employer contributions to the plan shows a concrete recog-
nition of services already rendered to the corporation and
improves the morale of employees.
One important factor in vesting schedules with respect to
close corporations is that the vested interest should be based
only on years of participation in the plan rather than years
of service to the business. This precludes immediate turn-
over and business destruction of a small corporation where
credit has been given for past service.
(c) Pre-Retirement Death Benefit-The maximum allow-
able death benefit, and that usually recommended, is 100
times the monthly pension at retirement, figured at the date
of death.25 For example, if an employee was scheduled on the
date of his death to receive $100.00 per month retirement
income, his death benefit would be $10,000.00.
It should be noted that such benefits, even though the em-
ployee is allowed to name the beneficiary thereof, are not
included in the gross estate of the employee for Federal Estate
tax purposes.26
(d) Pre-Retirement Widows' Benefits-The plan may allow
the widow of a deceased employee to receive a percentage of
what the employee would have received at retirement. How-
ever, such a benefit should be paid only if the employee has
served the corporation a minimum number of years or at-
tained a certain age, for example 10 years of service or age 40.
(e) Post-Retirement Death Benefits-As a general rule,
the death benefits for employees cease at retirement when
the employee begins to receive retirement income. However,
there are certain income options that should be available to
the employee to provide continued income for the family of
the employee after his death. By taking a reduced pension
the employee may guarantee that the pension will continue
for a certain number of years2 7 or for the life of his widow
after his death.28
25. Rev. Rul. 61-157, part 2 (d) which states that more than the recommended
100 times factor may cause the death benefit to be more than incidental.
26. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2039 (C).
27. Period certain option. See Rev. Rul. 61-157, part 5 (n), 1961-2 CLUr
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(f) Lump Sum Or Interest-The employee may be allowed
to receive his retirement benefits in a lump sum 29 in lieu of
monthly income and if so, it will be treated as capital gains.30
The pensioner may also be allowed to receive only the interest
earned by this lumnp sum figure,3 ' preserving the corpus for
his family.
All of the above benefits can be varied to suit the corporate
needs and desires. The plan, however, must have been in
effect for at least ten years for any highly salaried employee
to retire on a full pension.32 If his service is less than ten
years or if the plan has been in effect for less than ten years
upon his attaining the prescribed retirement age, he may be
allowed to receive a reduced pension and retire.
8. HOW? The how of a pension plan refers to the amortization
basis and investment method to be used in order to have the
capital needed for the retirement of the participants. The
guarantee of a fixed retirement naturally depends upon the
safety of investment and dependability of return thereon.
Since pensions are long range propositions and the retire-
ment income is specifically laid out for the employees, there
is an absolute requirement that sufficient funds be available
to do the job.
Basically, the two funding methods used are the insured
and non-insured. The one selected may depend on the num-
ber of employees covered but this is not always controlling.
It is safe to say that it would be unwise for the small cor-
poration to attempt self administration of a non-insured pen-
sion or profit-sharing plan without expert outside assistance.
There are six major factors to be considered in determining
the method of funding to be used:
1. The most important, of course, is a guarantee that the
necessary funds will be available.33
29. Rev. Rul. 61-157, part 5 (n), 1961-2 CuM. BULL. 93.
30. 26 C.F.R. § 1.402 (a)-1 (1954), as amended by T.D. 6483, 6497 (1960),
1960-2 Cui. BULL. 19 and 932 and T.D. 6676 (1963), 1963-2 Cum. BULL. 41.
31. Interest only option.
32. 26 C.F.R. § 1.401-4 (c) (2) (1954), as amended by T.D. 6675 (1963),
1963-2 Cu.-r. BULL. 151. Even if the plan has been in effect for ten years, the
full "current" cost must be funded.
33. Rev. Rul. 61-157, part 2, (f), 1961-2 Cum. BULL. 72. A qualified plan
must be a funded plan. However, employer contributions may be deferred so
long as they do not amount to a termination of the plan in accordance with
part 5 (f) of this ruling.
[Vol. 16
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2. The cost of guaranteeing this availability when a non-
insured plan is used.
3. The non-insured plan may, but not necessarily always,
give a slightly higher interest yield and the expenses are
paid as they occur.
4. Trust companies may invest in common stocks and equi-
ties and although the yield may be higher, the risk is
greater.
34
5. Insurance companies are generally restricted from invest-
ing in common stocks and equities.
6. The insured plan has pre-paid expenses which may cause
a slightly lower interest yield, but will definitely guarantee
the pension.
3 5
Individual policies are not necessary for each participant
although they may be used.
The three basic plans of pension administration are:
1. Group Annuity-This is often referred to as the "brick
method," whereby the corporation annually purchases a
small annuity on each participant as his pension income re-
quirement increases. This increased requirement is brought
about by current salary increases, and by adding a little
at a time, sufficient annuities will be available at his re-
tirement.
2. Deposit Administration-By this method the money is
invested annually, and at retirement an annuity is pur-
chased from the capital on hand. This type of investment
may also be handled by an insurance company in order to
guarantee the availability of capital.
3. Pension Trust-The trustee handles all investments of
funds, and expenses of the administration are paid each
34. See Rev. Rul. 62-183, 1962-2 Cum. BULL. 143 holding that state banks,
national banks, savings and loan associations, or building and loan associations
properly chartered and subject to Federal or state regulatory requirements
whose deposits are covered by the F.D.I.C. or F.S.L.I.C. are not engaging in a
prohibited transaction when they take their own deposits in an employees' trust
account. Such a transaction is merely a deposit and is not a loan even though
the grantor bank is the account trustee.
35. Since a pension plan is based on actuarial assumptions to provide fixed,
determinable, and definite benefits, any excess in forfeited funds, dividends,
credits, or actuarial errors can not revert to the participants, but must be applied
to reducing the next deposit or deposits thereto. Rev. Rul. 61-157, part 3,
1961-2 CuM. BULL. 78-80. Only upon complete satisfaction of liability to all
beneficiaries may the excess revert to the corporation-grantor.
1964]
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year as they occur. If the investment yield can be greatly
increased, the cost to the employer will be decreased.
4. WHEN? We now are concerned with the dates on which
benefits will accrue or be paid.
Normally retirement benefits are based on corporate policy,
and may be influenced by other factors such as Social Secur-
ity. Since Social Security benefits accrue at age 65, this
seems to be the most popular date for retirement benefits to
be paid. However, a corporation may select any age that
it desires so long as all other requirements are met3" and the
retirement age does not exceed 701/2. Early retirement on a
reduced pension,37 increased pension income for employment
beyond the normal retirement age,38 and other supplemental
benefit whens"9 as previously discussed may be included in
the plan.
5. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST-In arriving at a satisfactory
retirement plan, counsel must remember the various interests
to be served while assisting the corporation.
The corporation naturally wants to keep its cost at a min-
imum; the employee wants as many benefits as he can possibly
demand; people with more years of service feel that they
deserve more than newer employees; the higher paid employees
feel that they deserve more than the lower paid employees;
and there is the age-old conflict between male and female
employees. The older employees see retirement just around
the corner and want fixed benefits immediately, whereas the
36. See Rev. Rul. 61-157, part 5 (h), 1961-2 Cum. BorL. 91. Normal retire-
ment age should conform to that of the company or industry, and an earlier
retirement than 65 may not be used merely to accelerate funding.
37. Rrv. RUL. 61-157, part 5 (i), 1961-2 Cum. BULL. 91. Any reasonable
optional early retirement age will generally be acceptable provided, however,
that if the employer's consent is required, the value of the early retirement
benefit does not exceed the value of the employee's vested benefits at that time.
If the optional early retirement age is earlier than 65 (60 for women), and if
integration with old-age, survivor's, and disability insurance, or with the bene-
fits under the RAILROAD RETIREMENT AcT, is involved (see part 4 (j) hereof),
the benefits must be appropriately limited. See 1961-2 Cum. BULL. 140, or
1953-1 CuM. BULL. 292 whichever is applicable. If early retirement is due to
"disability," the term must be defined in the pension plan. See 1961-2 Cum.
BULL. 93.
38. Rev. Rul. 61-157, part 5 (j), 1961-2 Cum. BUr. 91. Once the normal
retirement age has been reached, provisions may be made to treat the pensioner
as if he is actually retired, defer to actual retirement without increment for
the interval between normal retirement date and actual retirement date, or
accrue additional benefits on account of continued service provided such pro-
vision is uniformly applied and non-discriminatory.
39. Supra, part II, A. 2. (a)-(f).
[Vol. 16
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very young employees can not comprehend reaching age 65
and would prefer to gamble more.
If the plan is non-contributory the corporation will cover
all employees that it desires covered, the plan is easier to
qualify with the Internal Revenue Service, unions prefer a
In studying these conflicts, counsel should know whether
or not the employee is to contribute to the plan for an in-
creased pension.4"
non-contributory plan, the supplemental benefits are designed
to suit the corporation, the tax status is more favorable since
employees must pay income taxes on the amount of their
contributions to a contributory plan, and the corporation has
more leeway in selecting the method of funding.
If the plan is contributory, the corporation must sell at least
80% of those eligible on coming into the plan,4 1 young people
with low incomes will be contributing money which possibly
may be better used for personal insurance and other needs,
employee demands will be greater as far as supplemental
benefits are concerned, employees will get larger pensions,
employees will tend to read and better understand something
in which they invest, investment of the fund will be more
conservative, employees are forced to save money which may
serve as an emergency fund, and employees may have a bigger
voice in who is to be covered.
When employment is terminated under a contributory plan,
the employee will get his investment 42 and his interest in
40. See Rev. Rul. 61-157, part 5 (h), 1961-2 Cum. BULL. 83. Voluntary
employee contributions of amounts up to 10% of compensation are permissible
provided employer contributions are not geared to employee contributions.
Voluntary employee contributions must be used only to provide additional
benefits. However, compulsory contribution percentages must not be so burden-
some as to be discriminatory.
41. REv. RUL. 61-157, part 4 (b), 1961-2 Cum. BULL. 81. See also part 4
(m) of the same ruling which allows the percentage requirements to drop below
the prescribed factors provided the minimum percentage is met on at least one
day during each quarter of the taxable year.
42. See Rev. Rul. 61-157, part 2 (i), 1961-2 Cum. BULL. 73. No interest is
allowed on voluntary contributions either upon withdrawal or in computing
benefits at retirement. A definite distinction is made between compulsory and
voluntary contributions on the part of employees. There can be absolutely no
withdrawal of employer contributions prior to retirement under a pension plan
except the vested interest, and then only upon severance or termination of the
plan. Neither can there be withdrawal of compulsory employee contributions
because these, along with the corporate contributions, are actuarially computed
to provide the basic benefits of the plan itself, and the only primary purpose
for such a plan is to fund retirement. All other benefits may only be incidental
thereto. Short term loans may be made, but only up to the amount of the
vested interest. See note 61, infra.
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the corporate contribution based on the vesting schedule if one
is provided. If there is no vesting, or if there are forfeited
funds due to termination of employment, such funds must
be used to reduce the cost of the plan for the corporation at
the next accounting date.
43
Initially, especially if past service is credited, there may
be a large capital outlay by the corporation to establish the
plan. However, the initial shock or burden is lessened by
allowing the corporation to spread its funding of other than
current cost over a period of years. In no case can the cor-
poration deduct more than 5% of the current participant pay-
roll as contributions to fund the current cost of the plan.
44
The corporation may, however, deduct up to an additional
10% of said payroll in order to fund the cost of past service.
45
This means that the corporation may never deduct more than
15% of payroll for contributions, but may spread out the
funding in order to take advantage of lean, as well as fruit-
ful, business years. In fact, employer contributions may even
be completely deferred provided that the corporation is obli-
gated to pay the full amount of the stipulated benefits to each
retired employee-participant after the funds in the trust form-




Basically, the WHO, WHAT, HOW, and wHEN are the same in
profit-sharing plans as they are in pensions, but the approach
may vary.
The purpose of a profit-sharing plan will set the eligibility
requirements. As has been stated, a pension plan has as its
43. REv. RUL. 61-157, part 5 (d), 1961-2 Cum. BULL. 88. Benefits which
are forfeited due to termination of employment or for other reasons cannot be
allocated to the remaining participants because a pension plan is based on
definite and determinable benefits. If forfeitures were so distributed it would
amount to increasing a participant's benefits above that actuarially computed to
fund his retirement. See also part 2 (o) of this ruling which prohibits the
creation of a contingency or surplus reserve.
44. 26 C.F.R. § 1.404 (a)-4 (a) (1954), as amended by T.D. 6534 (1961).
For the second year after installation of the plan and every fifth year there-
after, actuarial data must be filed in order to substantiate the contribution as
being needed in order to fund the plan. Mortality and compound interest tables
will be used by the Internal Revenue Service to determine whether or not the
corporation is deducting more than is necessary.
45. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 404 (a) (1) (C).
46. Rev. Rul. 61-157, part 2 (f), 1961-2 Cum. BULL. 72.
47. See Bruton, Profit-Sharing Plan, 5 S.C.L.Q. 201 (1952). This article
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primary purpose the retirement of employees, and any other
benefits are incidental to this purpose. A profit-sharing plan,
however, may be solely to provide severance pay, to provide a
form of ownership in the business, to provide a retirement fund,
or a combination of any of the above.48 If, for example, the
plan is for a retirement fund, the waiting period prior to be-
coming eligible may be longer than that in a plan designed to
provide severance pay or ownership.
As in pension plans, there must be no discrimination if the
corporation is to gain favorable tax treatment. In addition to
this requirement there must be a definite predetermined formula
for allocating the contributions among the participants and dis-
tributing the funds at a prescribed time.49 Since only profits
are to be used, there is no guarantee of any benefits ever accru-
ing under the plan. Even in good years, the corporation is
limited to contributions equal to no more than 15% of the cor-
porate payroll of those employees participating in the plan.50
This means that a maximum corporate deduction of $7500.00
would be allowed to a corporation having ten participants in its
profit-sharing plan if each is salaried at $5000.00 annually.
There is, however, a "carry-forward" provision which allows
a corporation which has had a non-profit year, to carry forward
the deduction to the following year if profits so allow the
contribution.51
Affiliated corporations, some of which may have a steady
non-profit history, may spread profits around so as to benefit
all employees of the other corporations.
2
Some profit-sharing plans may allocate profits among the
employees according to age and length of service. However, past
service generally is not considered in such a plan's formula.
Direct compensation, not including bonuses, generally is the pri-
48. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.401-1 (b) (1) (ii) (1954). A profit-sharing plan is a
plan established and maintained by an employer to provide for the participation
in his profits by his employees or their beneficiaries.
49. 26 C.F.R. § 1.401-1 (b) (1) (ii) and (b) (2). Although there is a
requirement for a fixed formula once profits have been contributed, there is no
requirement for a corporation to contribute the same ratio of profits each year
nor to contribute any sum each year. However, merely making a single or
occasional contribution out of profits does not establish a profit-sharing plan.
To be a profit-sharing plan, there must be recurring and substantial contri-
butions out of profits for the employees.
50. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 404 (a) (3) (A).
51. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.404 (a)-9 (d) (1954). This "carry-forward" pro-
vision allows a corporation to average the primary contribution limitation of
15% of payroll.
52. 26 C.F.R. § 1.404 (a)-10 (1954).
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mary basis for allocation of the profits.5" Quite like the pension
plan, the higher salaried employees will receive the larger bene-
fits if there are any to be received.
There are no definite fixed benefits to be guaranteed by a
profit-sharing plan, but neither is there a fixed liability on the
corporation in lean years.
Profit-sharing appeals to the newly formed corporation and
to the younger employees of an established firm as well. Know-
ing that retirement is many years away and that benefits will
be directly proportionate to the effort expended in assuring
corporate profits each year, young people are attracted to such
a plan. The older employees, on the other hand, usually do not
like this insecurity.
The plan must not be temporary in nature. It must be a
permanent plan 54 designed for perpetuity, and it must be ap-
propriately communicated to the employees. 55
There is no ten year requirement for a pension to retire
under a profit-sharing plan. He merely retires on his portion
of the fund. For this reason, there is a requirement for "tight"
vesting of benefits in order to make it attractive.
Once profits are allocated to the fund, they may be invested
through a life insurance company to earn a guaranteed interest
yield and have safety of capital, or they may be placed in trust
in order to seek a higher interest yield.56 This fund, even if in
trfist, may be partially invested in ordinary life insurance so
long as no more than 50% of the corporate contributions are
invested in insurance premiums. 57 This is a favorite method of
providing pre-retirement death benefits which are not included
in the gross estate of the employee.5" Due to the volume of in-
surance, ready future business, and low agent commissions, the
insurance companies provide a full reserve type of ordinary
life insurance for these plans which have first year and higher
than normal later year cash values. For these reasons, the in-
53. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 401 (a) (5) provides that total annual com-
pensation may be used in determining benefits provided this is uniformly applied,
and this includes bonuses.
54. See Rev. Rul. 61-157, part 2 (p), 1961-2 Cum. BULL. 75-76.
55. REV. RUL. 61-157, part 2 (k), 1961-2 Cum. BULL. 74.
56. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.401-1 (b) (5) (i) (1954). Local law determines the
restrictions on investment of trust funds.
57. Rev. Rul. 61-157, part 2 (d), 1961-2 Cumt. Bu.. 70-71. The insurance
must be converted to cash at or before retirement, or provide periodic income
payments with no life insurance feature after retirement, or be distributed to
the participant.
58. INT. Ray. CODE OF 1954 § 2039 (C).
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vestment feature is even more attractive than in most life
insurance.
There may be employee contributions to a profit-sharing plan
in order to aid retirement, but, as in a pension plan, there must
be 100% vesting in such contributions.
One problem with profit-sharing plans, due to required tight
vesting, is the attitude of employees after a number of years of
participation. Seeing a large sum of money growing in their
behalf and not having immediate use thereof, may often breed
restlessness and a desire to withdraw the funds. This, of course,
would defeat the purpose of the plan and destroy its value.
Employees may be allowed to withdraw money from the
fund provided that the lowest two-thirds of the salaried par-
ticipants do not withdraw more than 50% of their portion of
the fund.59 If such does happen, the plan becomes unqualified.
In drafting withdrawal provisions there should be a minimum
participation period before any withdrawals are allowed. Even
after this requirement has been met, withdrawals should be
limited to a percentage of the participant's vested interest and
allowed only for emergencies, the determination thereof to be
placed solely in a committee made up of participants and man-
agement.60 The committee must naturally be lenient in determ-
ining whether or not an emergency exists, but this will at least
place some control over these withdrawals. Even if there is a
withdrawal, it should be made only as a loan to be repaid in a
short period of time at a specified interest rate.61 The interest
rate, if one is used, should be lower than the prevailing rate of
interest of lending institutions since the employee is borrowing
his own money for an emergency.
A profit-sharing plan is a form of deferred compensation
which is owned by the employees. For this reason, the employees
should have a voice in the investment of the funds as well as
any supplemental benefits to be paid. Such employee partici-
59. See Rev. Rul. 56-693, 1956-2 Cum. Bu.. 282, modified by Rev. Rul. 60-
323, 1960-2 CuM. BULL. 148.
60. See Rev. Rul. 61-157, part 5 (o), 1961-2 Cum. BULL. 93-94. Whereas
there may be no withdrawals of employer contributions from a pension fund,
withdrawals may be allowed from profit-sharing and stock-bonus funds for
"hardship" reasons provided the term "hardship" is defined in the instrument,
the rules apply uniformly, and withdrawals do not exceed the participant's
vested interest.
61. REv. RUL. 61-157, part 5 (q), 1961-2 Cum. BULL. 94. Loans of an amount
not in excess of the vested interest may be allowed in all qualified plans. How-
ever, these loans may be treated as "distributions" if there is a tacit under-
standing between the parties that collection is not intended.
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pation in policy decisions further strengthens the plan and
cements employee-employer relations.
Should death benefits from insurance be paid prior to retire-
ment, any remaining interest must be allocated proportionately
among the surviving participants to increase their interests.6"
The corporation will in no way directly benefit as it would in
a pension plan by having its cost reduced.63
Lump sum benefits paid at retirement are treated as capital
gains, the same as in a pension plan.
64
Since the profit-sharing plan is designed to allow employeesa share of the business, "tight" vesting of benefits is required.
This is not to say that these benefits cannot be forfeited by the
employee. Complete long-range forfeiture provisions may meet
close scrutiny, but reasonable forfeiture clauses in the event of
voluntary termination or involuntary termination for cause
would appear to be satisfactory. 65
C. CO MBINATION INSURED AND NON-INSURED PLAN
One of the most popular investment devices used today in
pension and profit-sharing plans is a combination of an insured
and non-insured plan. This is especially good where pre-retire-
ment death benefits are involved.
A portion of the contributions in a pension or profit-sharing
plan is invested in the type of ordinary life insurance previously
discussed.66
If it is a pension plan, an amount of the contribution neces-
sary to purchase one-hundred times the monthly pension6 7 in
this type of insurance is so invested. If it is a profit-8haring
plan, an amount equal to 50% of the employer contributions or
an amount equal to the vested interest therein, whichever is less,
is so invested in life insurance. The remaining portion of the
62. Actually, the death benefit is only equal to the vested interest, and there
will only be excess funds if insurance was used in the plan.
63. A corporation may appropriately have forfeitures apply to reduce its
contributions under a profit-sharing plan if there is a fixed contribution formula
and such a provision is included in the instrument. Such a provision is not
mandatory as it is in a pension plan. See Rev. Rul. 61-157, part 5 (d), 1961-2
CUM. BULL. 88-89.
64. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.403 (a)-2 (1954).
65. See Rev. Rul. 61-157, part 5 (c) (1), 1961-2 Cum. BULL. 87-88. Upon
attaining the retirement or stated age, each participant must acquire a vested
interest in the fund. However, reasonable forfeiture provisions may be allowed
to preclude competition or divulging such things as trade secrets.
66. Page , supra.
67. Note 25, supra.
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contribution in either plan may then either be trusteed with a
bank for a higher yield or placed with an insurance company
as trustee for investment purposes to add security.
Regardless of the choice, the plan is attractive. If an individ-
ual Retirement Income Annuity was purchased, all of the con-
tributions would be exhausted should death occur prior to re-
tirement. However, by using the combined plan, all of the
proceeds are not tied up in the death benefit, but there is a
reasonable interest yield from the insurance if death does not
occur prior to retirement. This may best be illustrated by a
hypothetical case:
PLAN A. Employer contributions $ 300.00
Cost of Retirement Income Policy 300.00
Death Benefit 10,000.00
Fund left if death occurs after ten years 0
PLAN B. Employer contributions $ 300.00
Cost of Ordinary Life Insurance __ 150.00
Death Benefit 10,000.00
Fund left if death occurs after ten years 1,500.00
(plus interest)
In plan A the policy would provide the retirement benefit
and desired death benefit, but if an untimely early death should
occur, the entire fund is consumed.
On the other hand, in plan B we have provided the desired
death benefit, and the cash value of the insurance plus the
investment of the unused portion of the contribution, com-
pounded with interest, will provide the necessary funds for
retirement. However, should death occur prior to retirement,
that portion of the contributions not used to fund the death
benefit will not be consumed. These funds then will be avail-
able to reduce the cost of the pension, or will be allocated pro-




Qualified stock bonus plans are good for large, publicly-held
corporations, but are of little value to small corporations.
68. Apologies are extended to the actuarial profession for the figures used in
the hypothetical. They are by no means representative of anything other than
a very rough comparison between the cost of Retirement Income and Full
Reserve Ordinary life insurance policies.
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Such plans are closely akin to profit-sharing plans since there
is no fixed retirement benefit. Although the fund is comprised
solely of corporate stock, it does not necessarily have to be pur-
chased from corporate profits.
Eligibility requirements are basically the same as pension and
profit-sharing plans.
Generally, the corporation will trustee shares of corporate
stock based either on a percentage of profits or a fixed dollar
investment annually0
9
Naturally, the size of the trust fund will vary according to the
market value of the stock. This value, or book value, is the
allowed deduction for the corporation although no actual cash
outlay is made.
Stock bonus plans do encourage harder work because a definite
ownership in the business is acquired. However, such a plan
has many disadvantages. The employee owns only stock certifi-
cates and nothing more. If such a plan is used to fund retire-
ment, it may well be valueless when needed. Even if there is
an excellent "book value" on the stock, it still may be of no value
to the employee if the corporation is closely held. The only
value would be the right to dividends since there is no market
value to such stock, and the directors very easily could destroy
the dividend right by increased salaries to management. For




The plans heretofore discussed are limited to corporations
but are not limited to large corporations.
The widely used "Subchapter S" type of corporation"° may
take advantage of the availability of such plans although such
an entity has elected to be taxed as a partnership."1
However, partnerships and proprietors, even though they have
elected to be taxed as corporations,72 may not establish a quali-
69. Custodial arrangements may be used in place of trust agreements, how-
ever, a bank must serve as custodian. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.401-8 (1954).
70. Small Business Corporations. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1371-1377.
71. See Vol. XLV (Sec. 2) P-H FED. TAXEs REP. BuLL. 30, (July 23, 1964).
72. INT. RERV. CODE OF 1954, § 1361.
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Even though a lawyer may not be called upon to aid in the
establishment of a corporate retirement plan, he should be com-
pletely familiar with the affect of such programs on his in-
dividual clients.
7 4
Every employee who participates in an employee group benefit
program of any type has a need for proper counseling on how
his estate will be affected thereby.
For example, many corporations provide substantial amounts
of group term life insurance for employees which will not con-
tinue in force after retirement. In planning an estate, if the
client is depending on such benefits to provide adequate estate
liquidity to prevent shrinkage due to liquidation, he is realizing
a false sense of security. Even if the employee is allowed to
convert the insurance to a permanent type of insurance after
retirement, the premiums at retirement age usually will be
prohibitive.
As an employee approaches retirement age, there is a great
need for a complete analysis of his personal affairs and estate.
As previously stated, there may be an option which allows the
benefits from the retirement program to be taken in a lump
sum or in other modes of settlement.
75
This privilege will have a tremendous effect on the estate of
the individual, and an improper choice at this point could ad-
versely affect not only the retired employee, but his survivors
as well.
The biggest advantage to such a program is the systematic
guarantee of continued life income to a person who is no longer
employed. Unless the participant is independently wealthy and
the income guarantee is of no concern, counsel should complete-
ly discourage any lump sum receipt of the benefits. A slight
market decline or one poor choice of investments could com-
73. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1361 (d). A partner or proprietor of an un-
incorporated business enterprise as to which an election has been made under
subsection (a) shall not be considered an employee for purposes of section 401
(a) (relating to employees' pension trusts, etc.). This is not to say that these
persons can receive no type of retirement program tax benefits, but the rules
pertaining to qualification, vesting, deductions, etc. are completely different.
See § 401 (c) (1) and the extensive regulations pertaining thereto.
74. See CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING 340-389 (1961).
75. Notes 29-31, supra.
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pletely wipe out the proceeds, leaving the retired employee with-
out sufficient means with which to support himself and his
family. On the other hand, if the proceeds are paid in monthly
installments, the retired employee has taken complete advantage
of the investment skills and experience of qualified personnel,
without worry or cost to him.
Even if the employee is independently wealthy, he should be
advised of the net effect on his estate and personal income if
he should take his benefits in a lump sum.
First of all, he will pay ordinary income taxes on any income
received from the plan7 6 as these benefits are received. How-
ever, if he has attained age 65 he will receive double tax exemp-
tions for himself7" and will furthermore be in a lower income
tax bracket due to his no longer being employed. In addition to
these exemptions, he will have the benefit of the joint return if
married. 78 These income tax advantages can be greatly beneficial
when applied to the income option under a retirement plan.
If, however, a lump sum benefit is elected as retirement, the
payee will receive capital gains treatment thereon, but only if
there is a total distribution of the credits accrued to him.7 9 This
means that a partial withdrawal will not receive such treatment,
but will be treated as ordinary income.80
The big factor in aiding the estate problem of liquidity is the
tax treatment of the benefits remaining after the death of the
employee. If a vested interest is paid prior to retirement as a
result of death of the employee, or if there is an interest re-
maining in the fund at the death of the employee after retire-
ment, these interests will not be included in the estate of the
decedent-employee, provided they are not payable to his estate."'
The only portion of such a fund includable in the gross estate
of the decedent will be that portion attributable to the em-
ployee's contributions.
Furthermore, if the beneficiaries receive the total distributions
payable within one year after the death of the employee, they
will pay only capital gains taxes thereon.
8 2
76. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 72 and § 402 (a) (1).
77. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 151 (c). For problems encountered as to what
is or what is not "termination of service", see Bushman and Buchanan, Separ-
ation from the Service, 47 A.B.A.J. 738-831 (1961).
78. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6013.
79. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 402 (a) (1), (2), and (3) (C).
80. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 401 (a) (1).
81. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2039 (C).
82. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 402 (a) (2).
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This can very well be illustrated by a hypothetical case:
Richard Roe, age 65, has been General Manager of the Co-
lumbia plan for the ABC Corporation since 1935 and has par-
ticipated in the corporate profit-sharing plan since its inception
in 1938. Upon his upcoming retirement in January, 1965, Roe's
interest in the profit-sharing plan will be $300,000.00.
Roe has retired from the United States Air Force Reserves
with the rank of Colonel and receives monthly retirement bene-
fits of $300.00 per month therefrom. Roe's only dependent is
his wife, and their income from Social Security and other in-
vestments will boost their total monthly earnings to approxi-
mately $750.00.
Considering his insurance, home, investments and other per-
sonal property, Roe has a gross estate of $300,000.00, not in-
cluding his interest in the profit-sharing plan.
If Roe has a desire to preserve his estate for his surviving
wife, it would be foolish for him to take a lump sum payment
from the profit-sharing plan.
Should Roe take the lump sum and pay capital gains taxes
thereon, he still would have approximately $520.000.00,83 assum-
ing no growth or depreciation, that would be included in his
gross estate at his death. Assuming that it takes approximately
10% to administer the estate, and maximum advantage is taken
of the marital deduction,"4 there would be a liability of
$42,900.0085 on the estate for federal estate taxes.
If, however, Roe decided to take an annuity equal to the in-
terest earned by the $300,000.00, his personal income would be
increased by that amount8" and the entire $300,000.00 would
pass to his widow without being included in his gross estate.87
83. Roughly a 25% capital gains tax on the $300,000.00 from his profit-
sharing plan.
84. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056. This section allows up to one-half of
the adjusted gross estate to pass to the spouse without being included in the
taxable estate of the decedent.
85. This figure is based on a taxable estate of $174,000.00. The rate is
$20,700.00 plus 30% of excess over $100,000.00. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 2001.
86. Assuming a very conservative 3% interest rate, Roe's monthly income
from the profit-sharing fund would be approximately $750.00, giving him a total
gross income of $1,500.00 per month. This amount could, of course, be in-
creased by taking a larger annuity and yet still preserve a large portion of the
corpus.
87. Capital gains taxes will then be paid by the widow if the total distri-
bution is made to her within one taxable year after Roe's death. See INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954, § 402 (a) (1), (2), and (3).
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This means that his gross estate would then be valued at only
$300,000.00 and, using the same assumptions as before, his Fed-
eral Estate taxes would be only $13,700.00.
Roe and his wife have received a very nice income during his
lifetime. They have had safety of principal by leaving the
proceeds in the trust fund, and at the death of Roe, $28,200.00
of his estate passes to the widow which would otherwise have
been lost by the payment of estate taxes.
IV. CONCLuSION
The complications involved in counseling a corporation as to
the best type of retirement program are extensive, and no two
situations will be the same. Likewise are the many problems
involved in planning an estate of a participant in such a program.
There always has been and probably always will be the prob-
lem of insurance agents, accountants, and trust officers counsel-
ing in these fields. However, these people can and should per-
form certain functions in these fields which do not require
the practice of law, and they can aid both the lawyer and the
client in solving these problems.
One most important factor for the attorney to remember is
that in most cases, he will be dealing with highly skilled pro-
fessionals who are specialists in their respective fields. They
can be of great value in planning and establishing these pro-
grams for the mutual client.
Although the final responsibility for any and all legal prob-
lems involved rests squarely on the shoulders of the lawyer,
only by properly teaming with the other professionals involved
can the job for the client be accomplished in the most advan-
tageous and efficient manner.
These are resources to be drawn upon, and if properly utilized
can tremendously reduce the work involved, while at the same
time add much needed brain-power and imagination to an other-
wise very laborious one-man task.88
With all of these considerations criss-crossing horizontally
and vertically through the mind of counsel, there is one last point
that should be emphasized.
If counsel already has corporate clients who do not presently
have programs such as heretofore discussed, it may be wise to
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look into the advisability of recommending such a program.
After all, such plans as these certainly strengthen the position
of local enterprises by alleviating a most important economic
and sociological problem, namely our elderly society, at the
corporate level. This in the long run will force a curb on federal
spending in these areas. If these problems are not solved at
the business level, more and more federal control will be exer-
cised and the businesses will pay the cost of such federal pro-
grams whether they desire to or not.
When a corporation establishes a qualified plan of its own
choosing, the federal government will pay up to one-half of the
cost via the corporate tax deduction. This makes for "federal
aid" to the retirement plan selected by the corporation and not
by the federal government.
EUGENE L. BRANTLEY
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